Abstract. Three classes of models of QHC, the joint logic of problems and propositions, are constructed and analyzed, including a class of sheaf models that is closely related to solutions of some actual mathematical problems (such as solutions of algebraic equations) and combines the familiar Leibniz-Euler-Venn semantics of classical logic with a BHK-type semantics of intuitionistic logic.
1.
Introduction. Part A: The logic of some ancient mathematics
Problems and theorems
At the root of foundations of mathematics lies the old debate between platonists, who feel that mathematical abstractions exist independently of us and only need to be called out, 1 and constructivists, who contend that it makes no sense to speak of what has not been explicitly constructed. Modern origins of the debate arguably trace back to Cantor and Kronecker, and to the exchange between Hilbert and Brouwer (see [1; § §3.4] ). Yet a couple of millennia earlier, ancient Greeks have already underwent what may be seen as a multi-century debate on the meaning and significance of problems versus theorems.
In their words,
Problems are those sentences whose aim is to produce, bring into view, or construct what in a sense does not exist, and theorems those whose purpose is to see, identify and demonstrate presence or lack of a property. Problems require us to construct a figure, or put it at some position, or apply it to a given straight line segment 2 , or inscribe it in or circumscribe it about another, or fit it upon or bring it into contact with another, and the like; theorems endeavour to grasp and connect by demonstration the attributes and inherent properties belonging to the objects that are the subject matter of geometry.
in modern translations of the Elements. (In fact, at least from 16th and up to the end of 19th century many editions of the Elements provided more detailed headings of the form "Proposition X. Problem" and "Proposition Y. Theorem"; see, for instance, [15] , [16] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [22] .) Euclid stated problems in the infinitive (of the aorist type), e.g. To construct an equilateral triangle on a given straight line segment, and then in the course of the solution usually restated a specification of the problem with an explicit request added: So it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on the segment AB. Theorems were, of course, stated in the indicative mood, which is one simple way of telling them unambiguously from problems. Two other fairly syntactic ways were noted by Proclus:
"That there is a certain difference between the problem and the theorem is clear from what has been said [see also §4]; and that the Elements of Euclid contain partly problems and partly theorems will be made manifest by the individual sentences, where Euclid himself adds at the end of what is proved in them, in some cases, 'that which it was required to do,' and in others, 'that which it was required to prove,' the latter expression being regarded as characteristic of theorems, in spite of the fact that, as we have said, demonstration is found in problems also. In problems, however, even the demonstration is for the sake of construction: for we bring in the demonstration in order to show that what was proposed has been done [in agreement with Kreisel's clarification of the BHK interpretation; see [1; §3.7] ]; whereas in theorems the demonstration is worthy of study for its own sake as being capable of putting before us the nature of the thing sought. And you will find that Euclid sometimes interweaves theorems with problems and employs them in turn, as in the first book, while at other times he makes one or other preponderate. For the fourth book consists wholly of problems, and the fifth of theorems."
We will see in §3.1 that, firstly, this Euclidean interweaving (if understood as logical interdependence) can be expressed in a fully formal way in terms of our QHC calculus; and secondly, that this expression is only made possible as it stands by a rather simple logical structure of the geometric sentences considered by Euclid (more specifically, it matters here that what is given in a problem be of a simple logical form).
Let us note that theorems and problems, as discussed here, should not be conflated with propositions and problems, as discussed in [2] . Theorems are propositions that are considered to have a proof (symbolically, this corresponds to prefixing the proposition with ⊢), and problems in the sense of the ancients are normally the same as problems in the sense of Kolmogorov that are considered to have a solution. In some contexts, however, solutions are not assumed to be known (as discussed by Pappus, see §4) or may not exist altogether (as discussed by Proclus, see §4).
Postulates and axioms
As pointed out by Rodin [37] , the modern meaning of the word "postulate" (α In fact, older translations of the Elements often refer to postulates as petitions [22] , [16] ; and petitiones in Latin [19] , требованiя in Russian [17] , Forderungen in German [18] , etc. Actually, all major groups of medieval Latin manuscripts of the Elements (Adelard I and II, Campanus/Ratdolt, and at least one version of Boethius) speak of petitiones, with postulata appearing perhaps only in the 16th century [20] . Now Proclus also discusses several approaches to explaining the difference (if any) between Euclid's axioms and postulates (see §4). The view that he favors himself, and the one that is also of interest for us, is explicitly attributed by him (several times, to be sure) to Geminus:
"However, some claim that all these things are alike postulates, in the same way as some maintain that all things that are sought are problems. For Archimedes begins his first book on equilibria with the remark I postulate [i.e. I demand] that equal weights at equal distances are [be] in equilibrium, though one would rather call this an axiom. Others call them all axioms in the same way as some regard as theorems everything that requires demonstration. It seems that because of this analogy they transferred the term from the specific to the general use. Yet nevertheless, just like the problem differs from the theorem, the postulate differs from the axiom, although neither requires demonstration. The former is assumed due to the ease of construction, and the latter due to the ease of cognition. This is the ground on which Geminus distinguishes the postulate from the axiom."
In Euclid's text, postulates differ from axioms in grammar (cf. [9] ). While the axioms (called "common notions" by Euclid) are assertions expressed in the indicative mood, the postulates are written in the infinitive, preceded by the common introduction: Let it have been requested ... 12 For example, the fourth postulate reads: ... for all right angles to be equal to each other. The first three postulates:
(1) to draw a straight line segment from a given point to a given point; (2) to extend any given straight line segment continuously to a longer one; (3) to draw a circle with a given center and a given radius are phrased in the aorist infinitive, which is supposed to express a single or completed action. The main verbs of the fourth and the fifth postulates (to be equal and to intersect) are in the present infinitive, which is supposed to express an action in progress, continuing or repeated. In Proclus, we read:
According to [the view of Geminus], the postulate is concerned with construction, and the axiom with knowledge. So it is clear that the equality of all right angles [i.e., Euclid's fourth postulate] is not a postulate. Likewise, the fifth postulate is not a postulate: if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if extended indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles. For these assertions are not assumed in order to make a construction 13 they are only properties, asserted respectively of equal angles and of straight lines, produced on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles."
Interestingly, in many editions of the Elements published in 16-19th centuries, there are only three postulates, in accordance with the view of Geminus; see for instance [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] . In fact, according to [23; p. 171] , "Grynaeus's editio princeps [the first printed Elements in Greek, published in 1533, cf. [13] ] had the fourth and fifth postulates attached to the end of the common notions [...] The same ordering is found in Simson's influential eighteenth-century Euclid [1756, cf. [13] ] and many of the nineteenth-century English editions that were built upon it."
To summarize, we see that the explanation of the logical structure of Euclid's Elements according to Zenodotus, Posidonius and Geminus has resonated with a sizeable proportion of the mathematical community for about two millenia up to the end of 19th century. In this approach, the platonist and the constructivist that a geometer may find within herself are not irreconcilable enemies fighting for her soul as the 20th century foundational debate effectively made us believe but rather co-authors engaged in a continuous dialogue to mutual benefit: one being equipped with measurement devices, common notions about equality, and the method of reductio ad absurdum; and the other with construction devices, such as ruler and compass.
The tradition of intuitionism, and more generally constructive mathematics of the 20th century, has been to ban what they understood as "the law of excluded middle", but tacitly retain most non-logical axioms of non-constructive theories (with appropriate modifications). On the surface, our approach based on QHC looks entirely conciliatory: in QHC we do not prohibit arguments based on the law of excluded middle, but simply rebrand them as "a different mode of knowledge". But on a closer look it is in some way even more radical. Indeed, it is natural to move to the intuitionistic side of the theory those and only those axioms that truly (whatever that means) have the form of elementary constructions and to treat them as postulates (i.e. as primitive constructions), just like Euclid and Geminus. While QHC admits application of axioms and theorems in problems, and of postulates and problems in theorems, due to the inference rules p !p and α ?α , this does not produce "pure" problems from "pure" propositions, and vice versa but only those containing the logical connectives ? and !, which may well complicate matters.
Thus the validity of any logical inference involving both classical and intuitionistic sides of the theory does not automatically follow from the validity of its counterpart either in the purely classical analogue of the theory or in its purely intuitionistic analogue.
Thus, a theory over QHC obtained by typifying a classical theory T may well be more restrictive in its purely classical fragment than T , and, at least in principle, may be more restrictive in its purely intuitionistic fragment than a traditional constructivization of T . Thus our approach is in a sense a kind of ultra-constructivism; it can be argued to capture more of Hilbert's idea of a "finitistic", intuitively justified proof than usual kinds of constructivism do (compare [2; §4.2]). Let us emphasize that it is not at all clear how much of the principle of mathematical induction could honestly and meaningfully survive in the form of postulates (see §3.3 for a brief preliminary discussion). We will describe one specific theory over QHC (predictably, a theory of planar geometry) in §3.2.
Euclid and modern logic
A standard view, which goes back at least to the late 19th century and has been thoroughly criticised ever since (see, in particular, [27] , [37] , [21] and references there), but is still widespread [4] is that differentiating between problems and theorems was simply the ancients' way of speaking of what we now know as the existential quantifier. Indeed, upon introducing a rather large number of sorts of variables and of primitive relations (which seem to have been indeed treated as primitive by Euclid), J. Avigad et al. [4] observed that all sentences found in the first four books of the Elements are of a very simple logical form: ∀x(ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) in the case of theorems and axioms and the last two postulates, and ∀x(ϕ(x) → ∃y ψ(x, y)) in the case of problems and the first three postulates, where x any y are lists of variables (of multiple sorts each), and ϕ and ψ are conjunctions of primitive relations and of negations of primitive relations; in the case of theorems, ψ can also be ⊥. Here, for instance, "two given lines intersect" is taken among the primitive relations, and not explained in terms of the existence of a point common to the two lines (even though the relation of a given point to belong to a given line is also taken as primitive).
On the other hand, it is also clear that the ancients were not merely worried about existence of objects in Plato's ideal world (or in the sense of modern classical logic), but about their explicit construction. For instance, in his Book IV, Euclid shows how to construct regular 4-, 5-, 6-and 15-gons with ruler and compass, and says nothing of other regular n-gons hardly because he doubted their existence. (Some of them indeed cannot be constructed with compass and unmarked ruler, as we now know.) Many ancient geometers solved problems with a plethora of geometric tools more complex than ruler and compass, so they were certainly not obsessed with any fixed set of tools but rather with the very idea of explicit construction. In fact, the following comments by Philoponus and Eutocius (see [27] ) make it clear enough that the ancients were well aware of the difference between existence and construction:
"Those who square the circle did not inquire whether it is possible that a square be equal to the circle, but by supposing that it can exist they thus tried to produce a square equal to the circle" "Someone might think that he [Archimedes] has used for the proof a fact not yet demonstrated [...] To take a line equal to the circumference of the circle neither has been demonstrated by him yet, nor has it been handed down by anyone else. But one must understand that Archimedes has not written anything beyond what he is entitled to. For it is clear to everyone, I think, that the circumference of the circle is some magnitude, and that this is among those of one dimension; moreover, the line segment is of the same genus. Thus, even if it seemed in no way possible to produce a line segment equal to the circumference of the circle, despite there really existing some line segment equal to it this is not sought by anyone."
In fact, it appears that the logical distinction between construction and existence is explicitly attributed by Proclus to Posidonius (see §4).
Moreover, the ancients' notion of construction is very close to those of modern constructivists. Indeed, while proofs by contradiction and by cases abound in the Elements, it is almost explicitly asserted by Proclus, with an attribution to Geminus, that no construction relies on an argument by contradiction (see §4); and according to M. Beeson [6] , no construction in the Elements relies on a distinction of cases, apart from Problem 2 in Book I. As for this Problem I.2, Given a straight line segment AB and a point C, find a point D such that CD = AB, Euclid's construction does not work in the case where A = C; moreover, its output does not even converge to any limit as C tends to A. Beeson found a different construction which works in all cases [7] . Proclus notes in connection with Problem I.2 that whenever there is a case split, Euclid normally considers only the hardest case and implicitly leaves the other ones to the reader (which is indeed so in Euclid's proofs of many theorems); and then claims that in Problem I.2 it is necessary to consider a number of cases, and gives constructions in some of them. It is conceivable, however, that Euclid himself could have simply overlooked the case A = C rather than implying a different (namely, trivial) construction in that case.
In general, Euclid's proofs certainly depend on a lot of missing axioms and missing conditions in statements of theorems (see, in particular, [40] ), besides a really serious problem in the proofs of the SAS and SSS triangle congruence theorems (see [4] ). Fortunately, Avigad et al. [4] have compiled a full list of Euclid's missing axioms and postulates, and were careful enough to separate axioms from postulates in their sense, judged by the presence of the existential quantifier, but luckily this is consistent with the view of Geminus. In addition, [4] introduces two new inference rules in order to deal with Euclid's apparent circularity in triangle congruence theorems. These are certainly beyond the metamathematical knowledge of the ancients; but in Remark 3.3 we sketch a different way of avoiding the circularity.
As noted in [6; §1.4, §2.3], it is remarkable that Euclid does not use disjunctions. Theorem III.4 says that If neither of two intersecting chords in a circle passes through its center, then it is not the case that each of the two chords bisects the other. Presumably, he did not want to say anything like ... then at least one of the chords does not bisect the other. Strictly speaking, there is a disjunction in the statement of Theorem 1.13: If one line set up on another makes angles, it will make either two right angles or angles [together] equal to [the sum of ] two right angles. However, the first disjunct is logically superfluous, but perhaps helpful to clarify the meaning of the second one. Also, there is an "or" in the statement of Theorem I.26, but it is used in the sense "respectively" (i.e. this is really a conjunction of two independent theorems that are presented simultaneously).
To summarize, we have two recent attempts to make sense out of the first four books of the Elements in modern terms:
• The constructive geometry of Beeson [6] , [7] , which provides a reasonably adequate formalization of problems that Euclid solved or could have solved but fails to take account of the non-constructive methods routinely used by Euclid in proofs of theorems.
• The classical geometry of Avigad et al. [4] , which provides a reasonably adequate formalization of theorems that Euclid proved or could have proved but fails to take account of the rules that he adhered to in solutions of problems.
14
Interpretations of the Elements have been extensively discussed, mostly in highly informal language, by historians and philosophers from Renaissance to recent years (see [27] [21] ). Most notably, A. Rodin has suggested in his recent book on categorical logic and constructive type theory [37] that what Euclid was doing in the Elements might have been not exactly the axiomatic method in the modern sense (of Hilbert), but a certain entirely different kind of an axiomatic method (whose details are yet to be understood) capturing the spirit of constructivism and categorical foundations; he also draws interesting parallels between this alternative axiomatic method and the Univalent Foundations project (see [39] ). In our view, the simplest and the closest formalization of the letter and the spirit of the Elements is nothing but the usual (Hilbert-style) axiomatic method, only based not on classical logic but on QHC.
Such a formalization is outlined in §3.2. Namely, we describe a theory over QHC whose classical side proves all theorems of Euclidean geometry, as formalized by Avigad et al. [4] , and nothing else; and whose intuitionistic side solves all problems of Euclidean geometry, as formalized by Beeson [7] , and nothing else.
Part B: The logic of some medieval mathematics As mentioned above, our formalization of the logical structure of the first four books of the Elements, as it stands, is only made possible by the simplicity of the logical structure of the sentences involved. Now that modern mathematics is accustomed to more complex logic, is it still possible to combine the classical and constructivist approaches within the framework of QHC? As a first step towards this question, let us look at some mathematics that is inaccessible to the methods of geometric algebra as exposed in the Elements since trisection of an angle corresponds to solution of a certain cubic equation.
On algebraic equations
Let f : X → B be a continuous map (for instance, this could be a real polynomial f : R → R or a complex polynomial f : C → C, f (x) = a n x n + · · · + a 0 ), and consider the following parametric problem 
Similarly, the problem of finding a solution of the union of equations
is the same as the problem Γ f ⊔g (b), where f ⊔ g denotes the obvious map to B from the disjoint union X ⊔ Y . Thus the disjunction of propositions ?Γ f ∨ ?Γ g has as its truth value the image (f ⊔ g)(X ⊔ Y ). This image is, of course, the union f (X) ∪ g(X). The reader might already start suspecting that some kind of categorification must be going on. Conjunction and disjunction of parametric propositions correspond, unsurprisingly, to intersection and union of their truth values; whereas conjunction and disjunction of problems (which is, in fact, notationally represented by the traditional signs { and [ as long as we understand the line containing an equation as implicitly asking to find a solution of this equation) correspond to product and coproduct of their sets of solutions (in the category of spaces over B). Now let us consider the parametric problem Γ g → Γ f of reducing the parametric equation f (x) = b to the parametric equation g(y) = b. What is a solution of this problem, and when does one exist? One thing is clear: if there is a reduction of f (x) = b to g(y) = b, then whenever the latter has a solution, the former must also have one. This amounts to the following implication between propositions:
This implication in turn corresponds to the inclusion of the truth value of ?(Γ g → Γ f ) in the set (B \ g(Y )) ∪ f (X) of those b for which b ∈ ?Γ g implies b ∈ ?Γ f . Note, however, that if f, g : C → C are complex polynomials of nonzero degree, then by the fundamental theorem of algebra f (C) = g(C) = C, so the said implication is a vacuous condition on f and g.
On the other hand, we all know how to solve the quadratic equation
= b we see that it reduces to the simpler
, which can be solved directly: y = ± = b, which upon multiplication by w becomes quadratic (and so can be solved as above).
In the last substitution, z = 3 √ w, the reducing "function" ϕ = ψ −1 is necessarily multivalued if we work over C; in other cases of interest, it may well fail to be total. For instance, in reducing the real biquadratic equation x 4 + px 2 = b to the quadratic equation y 2 + py = b one has to deal with the multivalued partially defined function
, 0), the quadratic equation has two solutions, and the biquadratic no solutions, so we do not really have any reduction of the latter to the former. If p < 0 and b ∈ (− p 2 4 , 0), the quadratic equation has two solutions and the biquadratic four solutions, so we actually have two distinct reductions of the latter to the former. The number of reductions may well change depending on the value of our parameter b alone:
there is only one (vacuous) reduction, and for b > 0 there is no reduction, since one of the two roots of the quadratic equation has no (real) square root and so does not yield any solution of the biquadratic equation.
Thus reduction is, generally speaking, a local notion, depending on the value of the parameter b. Arguably, then, a reduction of f (x) = b to g(y) = b should be given by a continuous map ϕ : Our approach to this issue is that it is not the definition of reduction between parametric problems that is not quite right, but the very formulation of our problem Γ f . In fact, if we replace it by the problem ∆ f := Γ Hom(id,f ) , the issue disappears. In closed terms, the problem ∆ f (b) asks to find only stable solutions of the equation f (x) = b, that is, such x 0 ∈ X that f (x 0 ) = b and there exists a neighborhood U of b in B over which f has a section (that is, a map s :
What has been said above about parametric problems of the form Γ f carries over to those of the form ∆ f ; the result is nothing but a special case of the sheaf model of §2. 
Models of QHC

Independent principles
Let us consider the converses of the inference rule (? ⊤ ), and of the rule form in [2; 2.9(b)] of the primary law (! ⊥ ).
• ⊤-Rule:
?α α ;
• ⊥-Rule: ¬!p ¬p .
The ⊥-Rule, as reformulated in the following proposition, is related to a discussion in Heyting's paper (see [2; §5.2]).
This follows using that the inference rule (! ⊤ ) and the rule form of (? ⊥ ) in [2; 2.9(a)] are reversible, as discussed above.
Let us also consider the following bidirectional versions of the laws (? → ), (! → ), (? ∀ ), (! ∃ ) and (! ∨ ):
Here the "→" in the ?-and ∀-Principles and the "←" in the ∨-and ∃-Principles are equivalent to the respective laws using [2; 2.15(b,c)]. (To see that they imply the respective law, it suffices to use only one of the laws (!?), (?!).) In addition, the "→" in the !-Principle also follows from the respective law using (!?).
Proposition 2.2.
Here are equivalent formulations of some principles.
(a) The ?-Principle is equivalent to:
(b) The ∀-Principle is equivalent to:
(c) The ∨-Principle is equivalent to:
(d) The ∃-Principle is equivalent to:
(e) The !-Principle is equivalent to:
(e ′ ) The !-Principle is also equivalent to:
(f ) The ?-Principle and the ⊤-Rule taken together are equivalent to:
It is clear from the proof that the "→" implication in each line of (a,b,e) and the "←" implication in each line of (c,d) is a law of QHC; moreover in the case of (b,c,d) it is equivalent to the corresponding primary law of QHC.
Proof. (a)
. Applying ! to both sides of the ?-Principle, ?(α → β) ←→ ?!(?α → ?β), we get the first principle, !?(α → β) ←→ !(?α → ?β). Conversely, by applying ? to both sides of the first principle, we recover the ?-Principle. Now by [2; 2.15(a)], the right hand side of the first principle is equivalent to that of the third principle; and the right hand side of the ?-Principle is equivalent to that of the second principle. 
Hence, assuming the !-Principle, we can infer !(p → p). By (? ⊤ ), this implies ?!(p → p), and by (?!), we get p → p.
Assuming p ↔ p, we easily get the third principle in (e), (p → q) ↔ ( p → q). By applying ! to both sides, the latter implies the second principle in (e).
3. If p → p, then ♦q → q, where q = ¬p, and the ⊥-Rule follows. Conversely, it is well-known and easy to check that the following are laws of QS4 (and hence of QHC): (2) and modus ponens we get ♦(♦q → q). Assuming the ⊥-Rule, we infer from this ♦q → q. This amounts to p → p, where p = ¬q.
(f ). This is parallel to the proof of (e,e ′ ). In more detail, by (a), the ?-Principle is equivalent to ?(∇α → ∇β) ←→ ?(α → β). The latter specializes, in particular, to ?(∇∇β → ∇β) −→ ?(∇β → β). The laws (?!) and (? ⊤ ) imply that ⊢ ?(∇∇β → ∇β). Hence, assuming the ?-Principle, we can infer ?(∇β → β). Assuming the ⊤-Rule, this implies ∇β → β.
Conversely, assuming ∇α ↔ α, we easily get ?(∇α → ∇β) ↔ ?(α → β), the second principle in (a). Also, by (! ⊤ ), ?α ⊢ ∇α; so from ∇α → α we get ?α / α.
There are also alternative bidirectional versions of the laws (? → ), (? ∀ ), (! ∃ ) and (! ∨ ):
Here the "←" in the ∀*-Principle and the "→" in the ∨*-and ∃*-Principles are equivalent to the respective laws using (!?) and (?!). In addition, the "←" in the ?*-Principle also follows from the respective law using (!?). The anticipated "!*-Principle" is by [2; 2.15(a)] a law of QHC:
Proposition 2.3. Here are equivalent formulations of some principles.
(a) The ?*-Principle is equivalent to:
The ∀*-Principle is equivalent to:
(c) The ∨*-Principle is equivalent to:
The ∃*-Principle is equivalent to:
It is clear from the proof that the "←" implication in each line of (a), (b) and the "→" implication in each line of (c), (d) is a law of QHC; moreover, in the case of (b), (c), (d) it is equivalent to the corresponding primary law of QHC.
Proof. (a).
Applying the ?*-Principle, (?α → ?β) ←→ ?(∇α → ∇β), to α = !p and β = !q, we get the first principle, (?!p → ?!q) ←→ ?(!p → !q). Conversely, by applying the first principle to p = ?α and q = ?β, we recover the ?*-Principle. Also, by [2; 2.15(a)], the right hand side of the ?*-Principle is equivalent to that of the second principle. Proof. Let us check (b). We have, in bare QHC calculus,
and by 2.2(b), the reverse implications are precisely the ∀-Principle and the ∀*-Principle. Thus these two principles taken together are equivalent to ∀x ?α(x) −→ ?∀x α(x). But the converse implication is nothing but the law (? ∀ ).
Proposition 2.6. (a) Each of the !-Principle and the ⊥-Rule is equivalent to
and implies
These in turn imply the ?*-, ∨-, ∃-and ∀*-Principles.
(b) The ?-Principle and the ⊤-Rule taken together are equivalent to
and imply
These in turn imply the ∨*-, ∃*-and ∀-Principles.
Note that we have already encountered (1 ′ ) and (4 ′ ) in connection with Euler-Tarski models and (2) and (3) in connection with Tarski-Kolmogorov models.
The said principles can be obtained from (1)- (4) and (2 ′ )-(4 ′ ) by "stabilizing" (i.e. either applying ! or ? to both sides, or specializing to problems in the image of ! or propositions in the image of ?). In fact, the "→" implications in (2 ′ )-(4 ′ ), and the "←" implications in (2)-(4) are equivalent to the respective laws using [2; 2.2 and 2.6]. (Note that the corresponding proofs of [2; 2.2 and 2.6] do not involve the laws in question.) The "→" in (1 ′ ) similarly follows from the respective law, and the "←" "stabilizes" to the ?-Principle. The "→" and the "←" in (1) "stabilize" respectively to the ?*-and !-Principles.
Assuming p ↔ p, the first principle in 2.2(e) implies (1) . The latter implies the !-Principle by applying ! to both sides. By 2.2(e ′ ), each of the !-Principle and the ⊥-Rule is equivalent to p ↔ p. But clearly (2), (3) and (4) follow from p ↔ p, using (? ∨ ), (? ∃ ) and (! ∀ ).
The latter clearly follows from γ ↔ ∇γ (see 2.2(f)), and also implies it by considering the case γ = β, α = ⊤. (b). Since the ?-Principle holds, by 2.2(f), the ⊤-Principle gets identified with α ↔ ∇α; and hence, by our hypothesis, also with α ↔ ¬¬α. The latter is equivalent to the Principle of Decidability (see [1; (6) and (26) We have thus discussed 19 potentially distinct principles:
• Kolmogorov's Stability Principle, Hilbert's No Ignorabimus Principle, and the Exclusive Disjunction Rule; • the ⊤-and ⊥-Rules and the ?-, ?*-, ∨-, ∨*-, ∃-, ∃*-, ∀ and ∀*-Principles, • the 6 additional "expressive" principles (2)- (4) and ( 
We do not count here the !-Principle, the principles in 2.5 and the principles (1) and (1 ′ ) in 2.6 since they are equivalent either to some of the 19 principles or to their conjunctions.
We will now see that each of the 19 principles is satisfied in some wide class of models of QHC and fails in some other model. (The independence of the ?-Principle will only be established using sheaf-valued models.)
Euler-Tarski and Tarski-Kolmogorov models
By composing the -interpretation of QHC with a topological model of QS4 (see [1; §5.8])
, we obtain what might be called a Euler-Tarski model of QHC. In self-contained terms, it can be described as follows:
• We fix a topological space X and a domain of discourse D.
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in a Tarski Beware that ?, even though interpreted by the identity, need not commute with → or with ∀ in an Euler-Tarski model, since the intuitionistic → and ∀ are not restrictions of the classical → and ∀ in the model. Indeed, in Euler-Tarski models, the intuitionistic → and ∀ can be expressed in terms of classical → and ∀ as follows:
Now that we have a model of the QHC calculus, we obtain Theorem 2.10. The QHC calculus is sound.
It is easy to see that in an Euler-Tarski model, decidable propositions are represented by clopen sets, and stable propositions by sets S such that Int Cl S = Int S (these include closed sets as well as regular open sets).
By composing the ¬¬-interpretation of QHC with a Tarski model of QH, we get what might be called a Tarski-Kolmogorov model of QHC. A self-contained description is as follows:
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in a Tarski model in open sets of X.
• The classical side is interpreted in regular open sets of X, via the ¬¬-translation.
• |!p| = |p|, and |?α| = Int(Cl |α|). In other words, |?α| = |¬¬α|. On the classical side we have, in more detail:
• |p| is a regular open set for atomic p;
• |p ∧ q| = |p| ∩ |q|;
• |∀x p(x)| = Int x |p(x)|;
• |p → q| = Int(|q| ∪ (X \ |p|));
• in particular, |¬p| = Int(X \ |p|);
• other classical connectives reduce to ∧, ∀ and ¬; in detail,
Beware that !, even though interpreted by the identity, need not commute with ∨ or with ∃ in Tarski-Kolmogorov models, since the classical ∨ and ∃ are not restrictions of the intuitionistic ∨ and ∃ in the model. Indeed, in Tarski-Kolmogorov models, the classical ∨ and ∃ are expressible in terms of the intuitionistic ∨ and ∃ as follows: A similar property of the ∇-translation will be discussed in §2.3. Proof. By 2.2(e ′ ,f), 2.6 and 2.7, the principles listed in (b) all follow from p ↔ p, which is equivalent to the !-Principle and aslo to the ⊥-Rule, whereas the principles listed in (c) all follow from α ↔ ∇α, which is equivalent to the ?-Principle and the ⊤-Rule taken together. It is easy to see that all Euler-Tarski models satisfy α ↔ ∇α, and all TarskiKolmogorov models satisfy p ↔ p. This implies all the affirmative assertions. Also, the negative assertions on the ⊤-and ⊥-Rules, Kolmogorov's Stability Principle and the !-and ∨*-Principles reduce to the other negative assertions.
Since Tarski The same model works to prove (b).
Sheaf models
A sheaf model of QHC can be described as follows.
• We fix a topological space B and a domain of discourse D.
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in a sheaf-valued model of [1; §6] over B. Thus, problems are interpreted by sheaves (of sets) over B; problems with n parameters by families of sheaves indexed by D n ; and intuitionistic connectives by the usual operations on sheaves:
-|α ∨ β| = |α| ⊔ |β|; -|α ∧ β| = |α| × |β|; -|α → β| = Hom(|α|, |β|);
-α means that each sheaf in the family of sheaves |α| has a global section.
• The classical side is interpreted as in an Euler model (see [1; §4.6]) in arbitrary subsets of B. Thus:
-p means that each subset in the family of subsets |p| coincides with X.
• |!p| = χ Int |p| , the sheaf provided by the inclusion Int |p| ֒→ B.
• |?α| = Supp |α|, the set of all b ∈ B such that the stalk |α| b = ∅.
Presheaf models are defined in exactly the same way, the only essential difference being that (the presheaf of sections of) a coproduct of sheaves is not the same as the coproduct of their presheaves of sections. We write Char F for the presheaf of sections of the characteristic sheaf χ U , provided by the inclusion of the open subset U ֒→ B.
As a simple illustration, let us discuss the difference between ∇ and ¬¬ in a presheaf model. Since 
Theorem 2.14. Every (pre)sheaf structure M is a model of QHC, i.e.
Proof. It is well-known that Euler diagrams interpret classical predicate logic (cf. [36] ). It is shown in [1; §6] that sheaves and presheaves interpret intuitionistic predicate logic.
Thus it remains to check that the additional primary laws and inference rules of QHC are satisfied in M.
Indeed, if |α| has a global section, then Supp |α| = B. Conversely, if |p| = B, then Char(Int |p|) has a global section. To construct a presheaf morphism Char U → Char V , it suffices to show that Euler-Tarski models should not be confused with the class of (pre)sheaf models of QHC where all atomic problems are interpreted by the characteristic (pre)sheaves of open subsets of B. Indeed, non-atomic problems containing ∨ and ∃ will generally not be interpreted by such (pre)sheaves, but only by their coproducts. In fact, it is easy to see that the connection between (pre)sheaf and Euler-Tarski models is provided by the ∇-translation (see [2; §3.1]). By previous results, (a) also implies failure of all other principles considered above, with the exception of the Exclusive Disjunction Rule.
Proof. (a).
The ⊤-Rule is easy to refute; for instance, the sheaf χ (−∞,1) ⊔ χ (−1,∞) over R has no global sections, yet its support is the entire R.
Models where the ∀-and ?-Principles fail are given by [1; 6.4 and 6.7], respectively. The ∨-, ∃-, and ∀*-Principles can be written in the language of QS4 and so can be refuted just like in the proof of Theorem 2.12.
The ∨*-and ∃*-Principles are equivalent by 2.3(c,d) to asserting that ∇ commutes with intuitionistic ∨ and ∃. This is not the case for the characteristic sheaves of any non-disjoint open subsets of B not contained one in another.
(b). Let p = ?α and q = ?β. Then by (? ∨ ), ∇(α ∨ β) is equivalent to !(p ∨ q). Also, ¬(α ∨ β) is equivalent to !¬(p ∨ q), so its validity amounts to disjointness of the supports |p|, |q| of the sheaves |α|, |β|. Given that they are disjoint, the sheaves |!(p ∨ q)| and |!p| ⊔ |!q| are clearly isomorphic.
Remark 2.18. The proof of theorem 2.14 works to show that the definition of α in sheaf and presheaf models of QHC can be relaxed just like in the local and uniform models of [1] . (Indeed, the only new thing to check is the satisfaction of the inference rules (? ⊤ ) and (! ⊤ ) with the new definition; but this is trivial.)
Then by design, local (pre)sheaf models will satisfy the ⊤-Rule for problems with no parameters (but not for arbitrary problems, as shown by the example in [1; 6.4]). Note that the example given above works to refute the ⊤-Rule for problem with no parameters in some regular sheaf models. Uniform sheaf models also need not satisfy the ⊤-Rule for closed formulas, by the example given in [1; 6.24]: F = n∈N χ (ln(n−1), ln(n+1)) over (0, ∞) with the usual uniformity induced from R.
In the uniform sheaf model where B = (0, ∞) with Euclidean uniformity, the ∃*-Principle fails for the sheaves F i = χ (ln(n−1), ln(n+1)) , and the ∨*-Principle fails for F odd = i F 2i+1 and F even = i F 2i . The same argument works for uniform presheaf models. Example [1; 6.20] works to refute the ∨*-Principle (and a fortiori the ∃*-Principle) in local sheaf models.
The proof of Theorem 2.17 works to refute the ?-, ∨-, ∃-, ∀ and ∀*-Principles and to confirm the Exclusive Disjunction Rule in some local and uniform sheaf and presheaf models. Thus, all our principles, with exception of the Exclusive Disjunction Rule, fail in some local and uniform sheaf and presheaf models; in addition, the ⊤-Rule for problems with no parameter also fails in uniform (but not local) sheaf and presheaf models.
Theories over QHC
How to set up a theory
Let us now discuss how one might go about setting up a formal theory to describe some well-understood area of mathematics in the language of QHC. Our primary material for testing general predictions will be the case of plane geometry, whose informal understanding in terms of theorems and problems is arguably the best available (see §1.3). A. One basic type of a problem is, Find an x such that p(x), where x is an undetermined object of a specified type, and p(x) is a property of x. Thus p(x) is naturally represented by a formula of the proposition type, and we have to do something about it to make it usable within a formula of the problem type. Now our problem can also be formulated in more detail as Find an x and prove that p(x), which suggests representing it symbolically as ∃x !p(x). In fact, there is a good reason for stating it in this particular way: the Proclus-Kreisel principle tells us that any solution of our problem must anyway include a proof of p(x). Moreover, it is now clear how proofs can be included within solutions of problems (as required by the Proclus-Kreisel Principle): they would simply occur under the ! signs. For instance, every solution of the problem ∃x ![q(x) ∧ (q(x) → p(x))] yields a solution of ∃x !p(x).
Likewise, we see how theorems can be applied in problems. A theorem of the form ⊢ ∀x [p(x) → q(x)] (as in Euclid) , can be applied to reduce a problem of the form ∀x [!p(x) → ∃y !r(x, y)] (as in Euclid) to the problem ∀x [!q(x) → ∃y !r(x, y)]. Indeed, using (! ⊤ ), (! ∀ ) and (! → ), we infer from the said theorem a solution of the problem ∀x[!p(x) → !q(x)], which enables the said reduction by means of intuitionistic logic alone. Similarly, a theorem of the form ⊢ ∀x, y [r(x, y) → s(x, y)] can be applied to get from a solution of a problem of the form ∀x [!p(x) → ∃y !r(x, y)] a solution of the problem ∀x [!p(x) → ∃y !s(x, y)].
We see that it is natural to represent Euclid's problems by using the !'s as above, but on the other hand we can perhaps do without any atomic problems. This leads us to consider the class of pure propositions, which are propositions not involving the ? and ! symbols, and the class of simple problems, which are obtained by applying intuitionistic connectives not to atomic problems, but only to problems of the form !q, where q is a pure proposition. Such propositions q will be called the conditions of the simple problem.
To summarize, Pure theorems can be applied in solutions of simple problems.
B. Next, we would like to be able to follow Euclid when he first solves some problem and then applies that in order to prove some theorem. The only way that QHC would let us do such an application is by using the inference rule (? ⊤ ). If a problem α has been solved, this rule enables us to infer the lemma ⊢ ?α. In particular, we will always run into a lemma of this form whenever we want to use a postulate in the course of proving a theorem. But if we want this theorem to be pure, we will have to get rid of the !'s and the ? prefix in the statement of the lemma as well.
For instance, if α = ∀x !p(x), we can do it by observing that ?∃x !p(x) implies ∃x ?!p(x), which in turn implies ∃x p(x) using that ?!q ⇒ q. In general, for any atomless problem prefixed by a ?, we can use the BHK-motivated axioms to push the ? towards the inside of the formula, through any occurrences of ∧, ∨, ∃, ∀ (which turn from intuitionistic into classical upon the pushing). We can also push ? once through a ¬, but not any further; also we can push it once through a →, and of the two resulting ?'s, the one in the premise cannot be pushed any further, but the one in the conclusion can keep going. Assuming that the premise of every implication as well as the object of every negation is of the form !p, this process will terminate, and its result will be a proposition obtained from the original atomless problem by modifying the prefix ! of every condition into ?!. If the formula contains no implications and negations at all, then we can again get rid of every such ?! using that ?!q → q. Now even Euclid's problems, which have an extremely simple logical structure, are not implication-free. For example, if the problem ∀x [!p(x) → ∃y !q(x, y)] is solved, then we get the lemma ⊢ ∀x [?!p(x) → ∃y ?!q(x, y)], where only the second occurrence of ?! can be removed due to ?!q ⇒ q. In order to be able to remove the first one, it seems the best we can do is to assume that the condition p is certifiable, that is, equivalent to a proposition of the form ?α for some problem α (for this implies p → ?!p due to α ⇒ !?α; conversely, p → ?!p implies certifiability of p due to ?!p ⇒ p).
The requirement that every condition entering the premise of an implication be certifiable appears to be intuitively justified; for in general, we cannot build an explicit construction merely on the basis of a proof of some assertion unless this proof happens to be supported by another explicit construction.
To summarize, The solubility a of simple problem α can be used within proofs of pure theorems as long as the premises of all intuitionistic implications and the objects of all intuitionistic negations occurring in α are of the form !p, where p is certifiable.
C. Let us now recall (see §1.3) that Euclid's problems, if treated as simple problems, may all be written in the form ∀x [!p(x) → ∃y !q(x, y)], where p and q are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic propositions (and x, y are lists of variables). Let us call call such problems Euclidean; and let us call a problem weakly Euclidean, if it is simple, and the premise of every implication as well as the subject of every negation is of the form !p, where p is obtained from atomic and negated atomic propositions by using only ∧, ∨, ∃. These three connectives commute with ?; thus if the atomic and negated atomic propositions are certifiable, then so is p. Thus, weakly Euclidean problems can be applied in proofs of pure theorems as long as their atomic and negated atomic propositions are certifiable.
The requirement that atomic and negated atomic propositions be certifiable is of course not hard to satisfy by way of "cutting the Gordian knot". That is, we can simply include two new axioms p → ?!p and ¬p → ?!¬p for each atomic proposition p; in words, Should p or ¬p hold, there must be some proof of it.
One might hope to prove, rather than postulate, certifiability of atomic and negated atomic propositions in particular theories of interest; unfortunately, this does not seem to be feasible in practice. For example, if the language contains equality (regarded as an atomic proposition depending on two variables and satisfying the usual axioms as in logic with equality), it might seem that the atomic proposition x = y should be equivalent to the proposition "one can find a z such that z = x and z = y", i.e., ?∃z!(z = x ∧ z = y). Indeed, "given that x = y", it is certainly possible "to find a z such that z = x and z = y"; however, as discussed above, the proper way of writing this down is
and not
Indeed, ( * ) follows trivially from the axioms of QHC and transitivity of equality, via ∃z!(z = x ∧ x = y), and in fact one also similarly gets the converse to ( * ). Hence ( * * ) is equivalent to x = y → ?!(x = y), which clearly does not follow. In fact, with it we are back to cutting the Gordian knot. Since semi-decidability of p is equivalent to that of ¬p, and implies semi-stability of p, which in turn is equivalent to stability of p [2; 2.26(a)], we get Corollary 3.2. If p and ¬p are certifiable, then p and ¬p are stable; in particular,
One consequence of (a) is that a Euclidean problem whose atomic and negated atomic propositions are certifiable is equivalent to a pure simple problem, that is, a problem containing no atomic problems and no ?'s, and where every atomic proposition is prefixed by "!". This is a somewhat different view of Euclid's problems: these are now represented by formulas built out of blocks of the form !p, where p is an atomic proposition, by means of intuitionistic connectives. An advantage of this view is that arbitrary pure simple problems can be identified with arbitrary formulas of intuitionistic logic, just like arbitrary pure propositions can be identified with arbitrary formulas of classical logic; but there is no obvious way to understand arbitrary simple problems independently of the QHC calculus.
Remark 3.3. Let us illustrate the power of QHC (and some of the preceding analysis) by devising a simple remedy for Euclid's apparent shortcoming. Euclid proves the SAS and SSS triangle congruence theorems (Theorems I.4 and I.8 in the Elements) by using superposition of triangles; yet he later applies the SAS congruence theorem in order to construct a copy of a given angle on some side of a given ray (Problem I.23). But if triangles could be copied, then a fortiori one can copy angles. This apparent circularity presents a notorious difficulty to anyone trying to elucidate Euclid's implicit assumptions without correcting his arguments. If one adds copying of triangles as a new postulate, then Euclid's solution of Problem I.23 becomes pointless; but if one adds the SAS and SSS triangle congruence theorems as new axioms, then Euclid's proofs of Theorems I.4 and I.8 have to be discarded.
The approach of [4] is to add new inference rules rather than axioms to the system, which are a bit too clumsy to be reproduced here but whose effect the authors informally describe as follows: "What superposition allows one to do is to act as though one has the result of [copying a given triangle on a given side of a given ray], but only for the sake of proving things about objects that are already present in the diagram."
Over QHC, the same effect can be achieved by means of a simple axiom. Namely, if α is the problem, Find a triangle on a given side of a given ray that is equal to a given triangle, then by assuming ?α as an axiom (and not assuming α as a postulate!) we effectively permit to use a solution of α within proofs of theorems without permitting its use as a subroutine in solving other problems. To interpret α in the language of [4] , which in contrast to Euclid has no atomic predicate for equality of triangles, we can express it by asserting equality of all corresponding angles and sides of the two triangles.
Planar geometry
For simplicity we follow Tarski's approach [42] , the weak version corresponding in strength to Euclid's Elements [41; p. 26] (see also [4; §5.2]), using some of Beeson's modifications [7] .
The variables of the language run over points. The atomic propositions are the quaternary relation of equidistance (or congruence of segments), ab = cd; and the ternary relation of non-strict betweenness, B(abc). The binary relation of equality of points, a = b, is defined as ab = aa. We also introduce the ternary relation of non-collinearity A(abc), defined as ¬B(abc) ∧ ¬B(cab) ∧ ¬B(bca). This is not an atomic proposition, but merely an abbreviation.
We now formulate our QHC versions of Tarski's axioms. To simplify presentation, we will omit the universal closures; thus the actual axioms and postulates are obtained by universal quantification of each of the sentences given below over all its parameters.
The axioms of equidistance remain on the classical side:
Note that (1) and (2) imply ab = rs ⇔ ba = rs and ab = pq ⇔ pq = ba, which in turn imply ba = xy ⇔ xy = ba. The axiom of identity of betweenness, the upper dimension axiom, and the five segment axiom (which is a disguised principle of congruence of triangles), also remain on the classical side:
Here the upper dimension axiom has been modified using a tautology of classical logic. The axiom of segment construction, the lower dimension axiom and the inner Pasch axiom move to the intuitionistic side.
Here we omitted some degenerate cases from segment construction and inner Pasch, following Beeson [7] (note the misprint in his (A7-i), where all B's should read as T 's). Due to the omission of cases in the inner Pasch axiom, we need two further axioms, symmetry and inner transitivity of betweenness (see [7] ), which we keep on the classical side:
Euclid's fifth postulate, in the form of the triangle circumscription principle, and Tarski's restricted continuity axiom (the "segment-circle continuity" in Beeson's terminology) go to the intuitionistic side.
With our definition of equality in terms of equidistance, the symmetry of equidistance implies ⊢ x = x. Since we also have ab = cd ⇔ ba = cd and ab = cd ⇔ cd = ab, as well as B(abc) ⇔ B(cba), the remaining axioms of equality are consequences of the following three (see e.g. [31; §8]):
Finally we have our logical axioms, the certifiability of the atomic and negated atomic propositions.
We do not need Beeson's stability postulates, because our primitive propositions satisfy even the law of excluded middle.
Theorem 3.4. Let T be the theory just described.
(a) The pure theorems of T are precisely the theorems of Tarski's weak geometry [41] .
(b) The pure simple problems that are solvable in T are precisely the problems that are solvable in Beeson's intuitionistic geometry [7] .
This pretty much says that T does precisely what Euclid did or could have done in the first four books of the Elements. Indeed, Tarski's restricted geometry is shown in [4] to prove precisely those theorems that are provable in Euclid's setup, as corrected and formalized in [4] ; and Beeson's intuitionistic geometry is shown in [6] , [7] to solve precisely those problems that can be solved in Euclid's setup, as corrected and formalized in [6] , [7] that is, by ruler and compass, without case splits.
Proof. (a).
Each of our postulates is Euclidean. Hence by the process described in §3.1 we can, using the stability axioms, obtain from each postulate of T its classical analogue. Thus all axioms of Tarski's restricted geometry (with some modifications which are explained in [7] and in the proof of (b) below) are provable in T as pure theorems.
To show that all pure theorems of T are also provable in Tarski's restricted geometry, we use the retraction of QHC onto QS4 [2] and compose it with the retraction of QS4 onto QC. The composition simply erases all ?'s and !'s, and does nothing to pure theorems. But the images of our axioms and postulates will be provable in Tarski's restricted geometry (since the certifiability axioms become tautologies).
Remark 3.5. We may also look at what happens to T under the retraction of QHC onto QS4. This does nothing to our axioms, except for the certifiability axioms, and replaces ! by in those and in our postulates. Since distributes over ∧, we may assume that it prefixes only atomic and negated atomic propositions. But for such propositions p we have p ⇔ p from our stability axioms. Thus we get all axioms of Tarski's restricted geometry, regarded as a theory over QS4 via the embedding of QC in QS4, plus these four axioms of the form p ⇔ p for atomic and negated atomic p.
(b). We note that our certifiability axioms along with 3.2(b) imply Beeson's stability postulates, with understanding that his atomic problems correspond to our problems of the form !p, where p is our atomic proposition, and that he could have as well chosen non-strict betweenness as a primitive (which he explains himself in [7; §6.3] ). Each of our axioms is of the form ∀x(p(x) → q(x)), which yields, using (! ∀ ) and (! → ), a solution of the problem ∀x(!p(x) → !q(x)). When p and q are nontrivial conjunctions, we further use (! ∧ ) and our certifiability axioms along with 3.2(a) to reformulate it as a pure simple problem. Similarly, we can reformulate all our postulates as pure simple problems. Thus we get all the postulates of Beeson's intuitionistic geometry, albeit some are in modified form. Namely, our identity of betweenness yields !B(xyx) → !(x = y). Using the tautology α → ¬¬α, we get !B(xyx) → ¬¬!(x = y); in fact, this step is reversible modulo Beeson's stability postulates (which we have just proved). The latter is in turn intuitionistically equivalent (see [1; 29] ) to ¬(!B(xyx) ∧ ¬!(x = y)), which is precisely Beeson's identity of betweenness (see [7; §6.3] ). Next, our lower dimension axiom yields
which is intuitionistically equivalent to
This implies
and in fact this step is reversible modulo Beeson's stability postulates. Now the latter is intuitionistically equivalent to
which is precisely Tarski's original lower dimension axiom, as formulated by Beeson (see [7; 2.2] ). Finally, Beeson uses his "two-point line-circle continuity" (note the misprint in his formulation in §3.2, where he forgot to require that the constructed points of intersection belong to the given line), but he shows it to be intuitionistically equivalent to the "segment-circle continuity".
It remains to show that all pure simple problems solvable in T are also solvable in Beeson's intuitionistic geometry. The retraction from QHC to QH [2] erases all !'s and replaces each ? by ¬¬; it also prefixes all atomic propositions by ¬¬. This does nothing to our pure simple problems, except that the atoms get prefixed by ¬¬ instead of !; we thus take Beeson's atoms to be precisely these atoms prefixed by ¬¬ this time. Because of his stability postulates, this does not add anything new to his theory. Now our certifiability axioms become intuitionistic tautologies, and our other axioms and postulates turn precisely into Beeson's postulates (other than his stability postulates) with modifications that we have already discussed in the first half of this proof.
Let us note that, as a consequence of part (a) of the theorem, betweenness can be expressed in terms of equidistance in T . Namely, upon introducing the auxiliary relation of non-strict inequality of lengths, ab ≤ cd, defined as
we will have Tarski , and hence also in T .
Discussion: On certifiability
We have just seen that, at least for the purpose of formalizing Euclid's Elements over QHC, the axioms of certifiability of atomic and negated atomic propositions are harmless, in that they do not lead to any undesired consequences. However, they lack a good motivation, so it seems worthwhile to explore other options. When specific axioms and postulates have not been fixed as yet, one is free to interpret certain implications of the form "if p, then one can find an x such that q(x)" via p → ?∃x !q(x) rather than !p → ∃x !q(x); and then try to formulate axioms and postulates in accordance with these exceptional interpretations, as long as they appear to be justified. Let us take, for instance, Euclid's equality of points. Intuitively, we have x = y if and only if one can find a line containing x and not containing y; and x = y if and only if one can find two distinct lines each containing both x and y. Indeed, if we are somehow in doubt whether x and y coincide, for instance, if we can only determine their positions only up to an arbitrarily fine precision, but on the other hand we can somehow be certain of containment and non-containment of points in lines, and of inequality of lines, then by finding lines as above we would indeed produce a sort of certificate that x = y or that x = y. Perhaps it would then make sense to define equality (by way of axioms) so that it is not possible to assert equality or inequality of two points without being able to certify it by an explicit construction?
Incidentally, it is clear from this example that certifiability of p and that of ¬p generally have somewhat different content. However, by 3.1, if ¬p is semi-decidable and p is certifiable, then ¬p is also certifiable. At least in some contexts, semi-decidability of atomic propositions could be a meaningful assumption in its own right. At any rate, to simplify matters let us focus on certifiability of only atomic, and not negated atomic propositions.
Now if in setting up axioms and postulates we proceed to express all atomic propositions as asserting solubility of certain problems, whose conditions are in turn expressed in terms of other atomic propositions, then (as long as our language has only finitely many types of atomic propositions) at some point we will have to refer, directly or indirectly, to an atomic proposition of the same type as the one being expressed. While it is not obvious that any such circularity would necessarily boil down to "cutting the Gordian knot" in the sense of §3.1, even if one does not, it would be quite hard to prove this. In this sense, the approach of "circular certification" looks somewhat dangerous.
Thus it seems worthwhile to explore also the remaining option: introducing atomic problems. Here again one can simply declare, for each atomic proposition p (or at least for some p chosen so as to avoid the circularity), an ad hoc atomic problem α p along with the axiom p ↔ ?α p . (Of course, one can also do this for negated atomic propositions, and α ¬p would apparently not reduce to α p , since ?¬α p ⇔ ?!¬?α p ⇔ ?!¬p.) In specific areas to be formalized, one can ask, of course, if these artificially introduced atomic problems can be given any natural meaning, so as to motivate the new axioms. For instance, in our planar geometry (see §3.2) we have ab = cd if and only if one can find an isometry of the plane that sends a to c and b to d.
For another specific example, let us consider the equality relation in a group, in case we would want to do a formal theory of an abstract group over QHC. (In fact, as long as we have the multiplication, the unit and the inverse as predefined functions in the language, it is natural to leave all usual group axioms on the side of classical logic. Yet one can still formulate substantial problems in this theory, such as ∀a∃x !(a = xx) or ∃a∀x [!(x = 1) → ∃y !(x = y −1 ay)].) Thus we are looking for a problem α(x, y) such that x = y is equivalent to ?α(x, y). (Strictly speaking, we also have atomic propositions like x −1 = yz, but then we will also have problems like α(x −1 , yz).) If we want this α(x, y) to have some meaning, we are bound to strip our abstract group of some of its abstractness. There are at least two natural options: a represented group and a presented group.
If our group is identified, for example, with a group of permutations of some set S, then variables of the language run over permutations, and we may take α(σ, τ ) to be the problem, Check that σ(s) = τ (s) for all s ∈ S. This effectively reduces the equality of permutations to the equality of elements of S (which itself is not to be explained).
On the other hand, suppose that our group is given by a presentation x i | r j (where the r j are words in the alphabet X = {x i , x −1 i }), or equivalently by the 2-dimensional CW-complex K with one 0-cell whose 1-cells correspond to the x i and whose 2-cells are glued to the union K (1) of the 1-cells along the loops corresponding to the r j . Then the variables of the language run over words in X, and we may take α(v, w) to be the problem, Rewrite v into w modulo the relations r j (which means, find a based homotopy in K between the loops in K (1) corresponding to the words v and w). Note that this instance of destruction of abstraction goes in the direction of categorification.
By the same token, in order to understand arithmetic in terms of theorems and problems in a substantial way, it seems best to avoid variants of the Peano axioms or variants of the von Neumann construction, and instead follow the Frege/Russell-Whitehead approach, in which natural numbers are equivalence classes of finite sets. (Structures based on this approach include the categorified natural numbers [5] and the universe of finite h-sets in homotopy type theory.) Then again the equality predicate becomes certifiable, for if x and y are finite sets, then x = y if and only if one can find a bijection between x and y. Now that addition and multiplication of natural numbers are represented by the coproduct and product in the category of finite sets, we find ourselves in an obscure first-order corner of category theory, topos theory and type theory, where variants of mathematical induction can manifest themselves in an unexpected way [12] , [25] . A further investigation of the situation with induction seems to be needed (which is in fact an active area of research) before one can sensibly try to formalize arithmetic over QHC. It is also clear that eventually the intuitionistic side of QHC should transform into a constructive type theory, but it is presently not clear to the author if this transformation should occur before, after, or simultaneously with the desired formalization of arithmetic.
Appendix: Ancient meta-mathematics
Problems vs. theorems
The Commentary on the first book of the Elements by the philosopher Proclus [35] (see also [13] ) is largely and perhaps entirely a compilation of earlier sources, most of which are now lost (cf. e.g. [13; p. 33] ). In the opinion of Heath [13; p. 41, (5)] (which is apparently supported by the findings of Tannery, van Pesch and Tittel that he mentions [13; p. 39] ), the following extract from Proclus' Commentary (with the exception of the passage starting with "Both parties are right") "may fairly be attributed to Geminus", whose lost treatise Proclus explicitly quotes a number of times in his Commentary.
"Again, what follows from the first principles he [Euclid] divides into problems and theorems, the former embracing the construction, division, subtraction or addition of figures, and generally the changes which are brought about in them, the latter demonstrating inherent properties of each figure. Just as the productive sciences have some theory in them, so the theoretical ones take on problems in a way analogous to production. Now, in the old times, some, like Speusippus and Amphinomus, thought proper to call them all theorems, regarding the name of theorems as more appropriate than that of problems for theoretic knowledge, especially as the latter is concerned with eternal objects. For there is no becoming in things eternal, so that neither could the problem have any place with them, since it promises the generation and making of what has not before existed, e.g. the construction of an equilateral triangle, or the describing of a square on a given straight line, or the placing of a straight line at a given point. Hence they say it is better to assert that all [sentences] are of the same kind, and that we regard the generation that takes place in them as referring not to actual making but to knowledge, when we treat things existing eternally as if they were subject to becoming: in other words, we may say that everything is treated by way of theorem and not by way of problem. This is reminiscent of Plato's words (Republic 527ab, 510de):
"It will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts.
[...] For they speak of 'squaring' and 'applying' and 'adding,' and the like as if engaging in action and making all their talk for the sake of practice, but the fact is, one would suppose, every mathematical subject is studied for the sake of knowledge. And must we not agree [...] that it is the knowledge of what always exists, and not of something which at some time comes into being and passes away." "Although they [the students of geometry, arithmetic, and such laborious subjects] make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the square as such and the diameter as such, and so on. The things which they draw or mould, and which have reflections in water and shadows of their own, are in turn treated as only images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind."
We now continue with Proclus:
Others on the contrary, like the mathematicians of the school of Menaechmus, thought it right to say that everything is a problem, describing the purpose of a problem as twofold, namely in some cases to furnish the thing sought, in others to take a specific object and see either what it is, or of what nature, or what is the case with it, or in what relations it stands to something else.
Both parties are right [in a way]. The followers of Speusippus are right in that the problems of geometry are not like those of mechanics, the latter being matters of perception and exhibiting emergence and change of every sort. The followers of Menaechmus are right in that the discoveries even of theorems do not arise without recourse to matter, by which I mean intelligible matter. In going forth into the matter and shaping it, our ideas may fairly be said to resemble processes of emergence. For we say that it is the motion of our thought and the advancement of the ideas in it that produces the figures in the imagination and their properties. It is in the imagination that constructions, divisions, placings, applications, additions and subtractions [take place]; but in the intellect, everything remains fixed and without any emergence or change." "Now those who distinguish the theorem from the problem say that every problem admits not only what is claimed of its subject matter, but also its opposite, whereas every theorem admits what is claimed but not its opposite as well. By the subject matter I mean the genus which is the subject of inquiry, for example, a triangle or a square or a circle, and by the property claimed the essential attribute, such as equality, polygonality, position, and the like. When then one formulates this: To inscribe an equilateral triangle in a circle, we call it a problem; for it is also possible to inscribe in it a triangle which is not equilateral. Again, To construct an equilateral triangle on a given straight line segment is a problem; for it is possible also to construct one which is not equilateral. But, when one states that In isosceles triangles the angles at the base are equal, we must say that he formulates a theorem; for it is not also possible that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle should be unequal. Thus if anyone were to use the form of a problem and say In a semicircle to inscribe a right angle, he would be regarded as being ignorant of geometry, for every angle in a semicircle is right. And that which is concerned with a general property, present in all matter, should be called a theorem, and when it is not universal and is not present in every subject, that should be called a problem."
We will later see that overdetermined problems, such as In a semicircle to inscribe a right angle, are actually still considered by Proclus to be problems, albeit of a degenerate "excessive" type.
"The circle of Zenodotus, who belonged to the succession of Oenopides, but was a disciple of Andron, distinguished the theorem from the problem by the fact that the theorem inquires what are the properties possessed by its subject matter; but the problem inquires what is something that exists. Hence [the circle of] Posidonius also distinguished a sentence which inquires if something exists or not, and a problem 16 sentence which inquires what something is or of what kind; and they said that the theoretic sentence must be put in a declarative form, e.g., Any triangle has two sides [together] greater than the remaining one and In any isosceles triangle the angles at the base are equal, but that we should state the problematic sentence as if inquiring, say, whether it is possible to construct an equilateral triangle upon the given straight line. For there is a difference, they said, between inquiring plainly and without aiming at definiteness, whether there exists a perpendicular from a given point to a given straight line and investigating what is the perpendicular." 16 Heath thinks that this word problem "was obviously inserted in error" since it there is no corresponding word theorem [13; p. 126]; Marrow likewise omits it in his translation so as not to "violate the distinction that Proclus is expounding". Rodin, however, presents an argument supporting his alternative reading (also found in Shchetnikov's Russian translation), where this word problem is kept, but the corresponding word theorem is inserted [38] which I do not find to be convincing (by syntactic considerations, and also since Euclid's theorems do not involve existential assertions, as discussed in §1.3). However, let us note that the literal reading, where nothing is omitted and nothing is inserted, does make perfect sense: the circle of Posidonius made an additional distinction between a problem, which requests an explicit construction, and a non-problem (not to be conflated with a theorem!) which inquires "plainly and without aiming at definiteness" whether some object exists or not; hence the problem should inquire about the possibility of a construction and not just about existence. This is reminiscent of Kolmogorov's view of non-constructive existence assertions as "neither problems nor propositions" (see [2; §5.2]).
In another part of Proclus' Commentary we find another discussion of the logical structure of the Elements, which Heath again thinks is likely borrowed from Geminus [13; p. 40, (9) ]. Here Proclus gives a definition of problems and theorems (this is the paragraph quoted in the beginning of §1), which is followed by this passage:
"Every kind of question that is a possible subject of inquiry is considered by geometry, some of them being assigned to problems, others to theorems. Geometry inquires what exists, and that in two senses: it wants either the description and the conception or the actual being of the hypothesized [thing]. I mean, for example, when it asks What is the homoeomeric line? it wishes to find the definition of such a line, namely, the homoeomeric line is a line all of whose parts fit upon each other, or to grasp the actual species of homoeomeric lines, that is, it is either a straight line, a circular line, or a cylindrical helix. Therefore, geometry inquires whether something exists per se. This it does most of all in diorismi, examining whether the requested is impossible or possible, and just what is needed for it to be possible, and in how many ways it is possible. Now surely it also inquires what sort of thing is something. For when it investigates the properties that belong intrinsically to a triangle, or a circle, or to parallel lines, this is clearly an attempt to determine what sort of thing they are."
Problems vs. theorems (Pappus)
Pappus opened the third book of his Collection, addressed to a teacher of mathematics named Pandrosion, with the following words, which in particular suggest the perceived etymology of the words problem and theorem [34] (see also [8] , [11] ):
"Those wishing to differentiate more precisely between the things sought in geometry, my dear Pandrosion, consider it appropriate to call a problem [πρóβληµα] that in which one puts forward [πρoβάλλǫτ αι] something to do or to construct, and a theorem [ϑǫώρηµα] that in which, when certain things are being supposed, one observes [ϑǫωρǫιτ αι] what follows from them and in general everything that comes with them; whereas in the old times some said that all things are problems, while others said that all things are theorems. Now, one who formulates the theorem, learning in one way or another of what follows, considers it appropriate to investigate in this manner and would not formulate it rightly in another way; but one who formulates the problem, if he happens to have no knowledge and absolutely no practice 17 and prescribes something which is somehow impossible to construct, can be understood and should not be blamed. Indeed, the task of the person who is investigating is to examine also this: the possible and the impossible, and if possible when and how and in how many ways. But should one profess knowledge 18 as he puts forward something in an unexperienced way, he is not without blame. At any rate, some who profess to know mathematics through you recently examined in an inexpert way the formulations of some problems."
In modern language, Pappus seems to be saying that in contrast to a theorem, which comes along with the judgement asserting its validity, a problem as such has no truth value, and so entails no judgement; but an alleged solution to a problem again comes with the judgement asserting its validity. This should be compared with Kolmogorov's conclusion in his discussion of the object of intuitionistic logic [28; §2] : "Thus what Brouwer understands by an existential proposition is completely broken down into two elements: the objective element (the problem) and the subjective element (the solution)."
Pappus' words also remind us that the distinction between a proposition and a theorem (i.e., a proposition that is considered to have a proof) corresponds to two meanings of the word "problem" (either English or ancient Greek): a proposed problem, and a problem that is considered to have a solution.
The introduction to the seventh book of Pappus' Collection [34] also distinguishes between "two kinds of analysis: one of them seeks after truth, and is called 'theorematic'; while the other tries to find what was demanded, and is called 'problematic'."
It should be noted that both Proclus and Pappus discuss porisms, which are considered to be intermediate between problems and theorems. These are not used in Euclid's Elements (whose more advanced volumes contain 'porisms' in another sense of the word, which also means 'corollary'). The present author has doubts that the alleged difference between porisms and problems has anything to do with mathematics.
Bernard [8] discusses certain traditions of public debates and speeches in ancient Greece which may seem to anticipate the distinction between problems and theorems.
Postulates vs. axioms
We proceed with the words of Proclus, which Heath again ascribes entirely to Geminus [13; p. 40, (6)]:
"It is a common character of axioms and postulates alike that they do not require demonstration or geometrical evidence but are taken as known and used as starting points for what follows. And they differ from one another in the same way as theorems are also distinguished from problems. For, as in theorems we propose to see and determine what follows on the premisses, while in problems we are told to find and do something, in like manner in the axioms such things are assumed as immediately evident to our knowledge and easily grasped by our untaught mind, while in the postulates we assume such things as easy to find and effect, not requiring any labor of thought for its acceptance nor any complication of machinery." "Both must have the characteristic of being simple and readily grasped, I mean both the postulate and the axiom; but the postulate bids us contrive and find some subjectmatter to exhibit a property simple and easily grasped, while the axiom bids us assert some essential attribute which is self-evident to the learner, just as is the fact that fire is hot, or any of the most obvious things." Subsequent to the above, and immediately preceding the following is the passage already quoted in §1 (where Archimedes' postulate on equilibria is mentioned).
"It is by this argument that Geminus differentiates the postulate from the axiom. Others again will say that postulates are peculiar to geometrical subject-matter, while axioms are common to all investigation which is concerned with quantity and magnitude. Thus it is the geometer who knows that all right angles are equal and how to extend a straight line segment to a longer one, whereas it is a common notion that things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another, and it is employed by the arithmetician and any scientific person who adapts the general statement to his own subject. Thirdly, Aristotle said, as we have mentioned above, that the postulate is demonstrated, and even if the student disagrees with it, it is anyway assumed as a basic principle; whereas the axiom cannot be demonstrated, and everyone tends to accept it, even if someone pretends to dispute it."
We do not know, indeed, which of the three approaches are closer to what Euclid had in his mind. We know, however, that Aristotle's view has been very influential, and is best compatible with the foundational paradigm that dominates since the early 20th century; but also that the view of Geminus has enjoyed steady support until the end of 19th century (see §1).
What is a problem?
Proclus also mentions some logical properties of problems, which somewhat agree with Kolmogorov's understanding of problems and solutions and include the possibility of distinct solutions for a problem.
The following comment, which appears in Proclus' discussion of Euclid's problem I.1, occurs within an argument that Proclus attributes to Geminus.
"It is true that, when the reasoning employs reduction to absurdity, geometers are content merely to discover a property"
In view of Proclus' statements linking properties to theorems (see above), this remark is apparently saying that arguing by contradiction is permissible only in proofs, and not in construction.
The following three passages also appear in the discussion subsequent to Problem I.1.
"Reduction is a transition from one problem or theorem to another which, if known or constructed, will make the proposed one evident. For example, in solving the problem of doubling the cube they shifted their inquiry to another on which this depends, namely, the finding of the two mean proportionals; and since that time they devoted their efforts to discovering how to find two means in continued proportion between two given straight line segments."
The problem of two mean proportionals is: Given lengths a and b, find lengths x and y such that a : x = x : y = y : b. Assuming that such x and y are known when b = 2a, one immediately gets from this the doubling of the cube, since .
"In general we shall see that some problems have a unique solution, others more than one, and some an indefinite number. We call 'determinate', to use Amphinomus' term, those that have only one solution, 'intermediate' those that have more than one but a finite number and 'indeterminate' those having an indefinite variety of solutions. [...] Problems admitting indefinitely many solutions would be such as the following: To divide a given straight line segment into three parts in continued proportion.
The said problem asks to represent the given length a geometrically as a sum x + y + z such that x : y = y : z. Algebraically, this amounts to the equation x(a − x − y) = y 2 . Proclus goes on to produce infinitely many solutions by Euclid's geometric methods.
"We must also recognize that 'problem' is used in several senses. Anything proposed may be called a problem, whether it be put forward for the purpose of instruction or of construction. But its special use in mathematics is to denote something proposed for theoretical construction, since the constructing carried out in mathematics is done for the purpose of theory. Frequently things incapable of solution are called problems; but more characteristically we use this designation for what is capable of solution and is neither excessive [i.e., overdetermined] nor deficient. A problem such as the following is excessive: To construct an equilateral triangle whose vertical angle is two-thirds of a right angle. For this brings in an unnecessary addition, since this property belongs to every equilateral triangle. Of excessive problems those that exceed by containing inconsistent or unreal conditions 19 are called 'impossibles', while those that contain realizable conditions are called 'more than problems'. A problem is deficient and is called 'less than a problem' when it needs to have something added to make it definite and bring it into order and scientific determinateness, such as To construct an isosceles triangle. This is insufficiently determinate and requires an addition specifying what sort of isosceles is wanted [...] These examples show that what is properly called problems aim at avoiding the indeterminateness that makes them have indefinitely many solutions; nevertheless the deficient ones are called problems, for the term is ambiguous.
These unsophisticated remarks are, of course, reminiscent of what in modern times one usually learns in the context of systems of linear equations.
Proclus also elaborates on his remark regarding Euclid's interweaving of problems and theorems (see §1) when he discusses the application of problems in theorems in connection with Theorem I.4, the first theorem of the Elements.
"For unless he [Euclid] had previously shown the existence of triangles and how to construct them, how could he discuss their essential properties? [...] Suppose someone, before these have been constructed, should say: If two triangles have this property, they will necessarily also have that. Would it not be easy for anyone to meet this assertion with, Do we know whether a triangle can be constructed at all? [...] It is to forestall such objections that the author of the Elements has given us the construction of triangles.
